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Abstract. From classic to modern economic theories, the scope and size of government in 
economy have been always main topics for economists. The governments have played 
different roles in a historical context. Provision of public goods is a generally accepted task 
for all governments. The supply of public goods requires efficient allocation and 
management of scarce resources. Government efficacy stems from good governance and 
proper planning and policy-making. This paper aims to bridge from government size to 
government efficacy the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). To 
this end, a panel data in the model is estimated during 2002-2015 by using some control 
variables. Findings indicate a negative relationship between government size and efficacy. 
In addition, oil rents affect government efficacy negatively. The trade openness result in 
efficient government. Finally, economic growth has positive effect on result in government 
effectiveness. According to findings, minimization of government size, injection of oil 
revenues into Sovereign National Funds (SNFs), adoption of open door policies, and 
targeting sustainable economic growth give rise to an efficient government.  
Keywords. Government size, Government effectiveness, Trade openness, Oil rents, OPEC. 
JEL. F41, F53, H11, P48. 
 
1. Introduction 
uring the early courses on economics, every student gets familiar to multi-
sector macroeconomic models. Besides firms and households, government 
is the third agent in a typical three-sector economy. There is no dispute on 
presence of government in different economic systems. In a liberal economy, 
government has to guarantee property rights, defend against hostiles, and provide 
public services. In a centrally planned system, government owns major economic 
enterprises, and allocates existing human and financial resources according to 
given plan. Finally, government plays dual roles in an Islamic economic viewpoint. 
In Islamic economic system, government holds most of natural assets and resources 
on one hand, and opens rooms to act markets freely on the other hand. However, 
how to intervene government in each society is controversial. Hence, size and 
efficacy of government is an interesting topic in public economics.  
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was established by 
Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela in 1960 in order to coordinate 
petroleum polices by its members, to secure fair and stable prices for petroleum 
producers; an efficient, economic and regular supply of petroleum to consuming 
nations; and a fair return on capital to those investing in the industry (OPEC, 
1971). 
This organization has experienced various economic and political challenges 
during 1960-2017. The substantial developments in the OPEC history are as 
follows: The first oil shock and Iran’s Islamic revolution occurred in the 1970s. 
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OPEC established a Fund for International Development in 1976. Iran-Iraq war 
took place during 1980-1987. OPEC introduced paper market for oil transactions in 
the 1980s. Iraq invaded to Kuwait in 1990-1991. War happened between Iraq and 
US-led coalition in 2002-2003. The global financial turmoil and economic 
recession increased oil prices to new records in mid-2008. Arab spring resulted in 
the fall of ruling authority in Libya, and so on. 
Due to entry-exit episodes, the number of OPEC members has been variable in 
the period mentioned. For example, Ecuador joined to OPEC in 1973, suspended 
its membership in 1992, but reactivated it in 2007. As of July 2017, OPEC 
members composed of 14 countries including Algeria, Angola, Ecuador,  
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
United Arab Emirates and Venezuela [Retrieved from]. 
Although historical trends indicate relatively bigger governments in OPEC 
cartel, however the quality of governance has been kept nearly unaltered. All 
OPEC members are of small scores in terms of good governance [Retrieved from]. 
In general, OPEC members have pluralistic political systems, which stem from 
financing budgets by oil revenues.   
In this paper, the main question is: "which factors affect the efficacy of 
government in resource-based economies?". To answer this question, we focus on 
the link between the government size and government efficacy in OPEC. This 
economic bloc is oil-abundant, so oil revenues and rents influence the effectiveness 
of government. In addition, OPEC members are inherently open economies due to 
oil and gas exports. Hence, oil rents, trade openness and economic growth are 
included in the regression models as control variables. 
The remainder of this article is organized in 4 sections. Section 2 devotes to 
theory and literature. Section 3 introduces the methodology. Section 4 explains the 
results and section 5 concludes.   
 
2. Theory and Literature 
The distinguished public finance theorist, Richard Musgrave (1959), classified 
the economic role of government into allocation, distribution, and stabilization. By 
allocation, the government affects the quantity and quality of outputs that the 
economy produces. The allocation function refers to direct government production, 
regulation, taxation and penalties for illegal activities. By distribution, the 
government influences the distribution of income and wealth. The government 
redistributes the income and wealth through construction projects, tax cuts, 
subsidies, insurance plans, and so on. By stabilization, the government influences 
the level of employment, output, and prices.  
All governments make fiscal policies in order to direct whole economy towards 
full employment, balanced budget, stable prices, and trade surplus. They are 
equipped with particular tools (taxes, tariffs, subsidies, and regulating prices for 
utilities) to achieve macroeconomic targets (Tanzi, 1992; Frenkel et al, 1996; 
Nijkamp & Poot, 2004; Feldstein, 2009). However, the government involvement in 
the economy is costly. As government size increases, its outlays grow too, but its 
receipts may change in different way. Ulbrich (2011) refers to citizen demand, 
bureaucracy behavior, elastic revenue sources, increased use of fees and charges, 
and lack of an effective budget constraint at the federal level as causes of rapid 
growth in government size. 
Governments have to finance both current and capital expenditure. Besides 
national defense, they should provide services in three general areas: public 
education, health care and social security (Lindert, 2004; Rosen, 2003; Shelton, 
2007). In addition, they may invest directly in capital projects including roads and 
highways, ports and airports, power plants, dams and so on. 
How to finance public expenditure depends on government structure in each 
country. Some countries like US have accepted both state and federal systems, 
which state governments are of financial independence (Oates, 1968; Boadway &  
Flatters, 1982; Rhodes, 1996), but most of developing nations such OPEC 
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countries rely on central government planning and budgeting (Alavirad, 2003; 
Karl, 2007, Fesharaki & Isaak, 2016). The government structure affects certainly 
the efficiency of government offices. If the level of bureaucracy in public sector 
increases irrationally, and when public authorities are less accountable, then 
financial and administrative corruption will be likely high.  
Although governments have different financing methods to cover expenses, 
however they share in taxes and fees as traditional instruments for gathering public 
funds. The numerous empirical studies confirm the high dependency of 
governments on tax-based financing in democratic systems (Scharpf, 1997; Swank 
& Steinmo, 2002; Lancia & Russo, 2016; Eusepi & Wagner, 2017). Moreover, in 
emerging economies, foreign direct investment (FDI) boosts public financial 
affordability through local transfers and taxes to host government (Kim & Wu, 
2008; Kumar & Baldacci, 2010; Wang et al, 2012). However, OPEC bloc is 
heavily reliant on exports of oil, gas, petrochemicals and petroleum products. 
Evidently, OPEC members choose the cheapest way to finance their economies, 
i.e., oil-based financing. 
Due to freedom to express views and ideas, people in democratic systems 
monitor the performance of ruling political parties through mass media, 
newspapers, written reports, social networks and even web-based sources (Street, 
2010; Norris, 2011; Nisbet et al, 2012). Hence, sometimes people protest against 
ruling party in the form of civil demonstrations. This continuous monitoring can 
reveal the government inefficiency or failure in satisfying public wants. As a result, 
the frequent reforms in political regimes may improve the governance by next 
cabinets. This is the fruit of democracy.  
In resource-based economies, the easy access to foreign incomes causes 
resource rents (Auty, 2007; Boschini et al, 2007; Stevens & Dietsche, 2008; 
Frankel, 2010). These rents combined with totalitarian systems result in various 
socio-politic problems. Willing to grasp resource rents by individuals and public 
authorities fuels the fraud, kickback and systematic corruption. The final output is 
social unrest, riots, civil war, and people uprising, which was experienced in some 
MENA countries during early 2010s. In this regard, the history of OPEC is full of 
complicated political events. The regime change in Iraq and Iran in the 1970s and 
Libya revolution in 2010 are samples of turmoil.  
In the evolutionary course of public economics, various theories have tried to 
explain necessity of public sector, size of the government and composition of 
public expenditure (Hindriks & Myles, 2013). The efficiency and equity are two 
ideals and common features in these theories. Efficiency means to produce more 
output per inputs consumed and to minimize the wastes of resources, whereas 
equity relates to the fair distribution of income, wealth and opportunity. To make 
efficient policies to reach both equity and efficiency requires the skilled, well-
informed, and honest public authorities and managers.  
The main reason for the presence of a public sector is that fully free economy 
cannot operate efficiently if there are no specified property rights. The lack of 
property rights eliminates the trust among people and enterprises. In Hobbes 
(2010)2 view, government as a social contract hinders social anarchy and protects 
the property rights. Property rights are prerequisites to enforce lawful contracts and 
commitments. 
The formation and control of property rights is not free of charge. The judicial 
process to resolve disputes requires well-organized courts and skilled judges 
(Hirschl, 2009; Rose-Ackerman, 2010). This legal system lies in public sector body 
in a general term. The enforcement of contracts and laws, the provision of security 
and public services, and collection of taxes justify the need for a minimal public 
sector. Furthermore, government intervention in the economy may increases social 
welfare. 
 
2 . Revised of 1651’s version 
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When market fails in valuation of private and social benefits/costs correctly, the 
government should intervene to amend the market inefficiency. In a broader sense, 
negative externalities, the need for public goods, and existence of imperfect 
competition motivate the government intervention (Cullis et al, 2009; Stiglitz, 
2010; Atkinson & Stiglitz, 2015). Certainly, government intervention is not always 
advantageous, especially if the government is not accountable. Thus, the extent of 
intervention is of crucial importance in public economics. Evidently, a corrupt and 
ineffective government imposes additional costs to the whole economy. As Rose-
Ackerman & Palifka (2016) point out corruption can be a symbol of government 
failure. 
To reduce the inequality of income, wealth or opportunity is another 
justification for the government involvement in the economy (Rothstein, 2011; 
Giddens, 2013). In such environment, the government may improve the social 
welfare through poverty alleviation plans, public health and education services and 
social security programs. 
An efficient government is able to match its expenditure and income. Hence, a 
robust nexus may exist between government size and efficacy. 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Data and variables  
In this research, the statistical sample consists of OPEC members. Because of 
variability of number of members, this sample covers 12 out of 14 countries over 
the period 2002-2015. Therefore, it excludes Equatorial Guinea and Gabon.   
To reply the question outlined in section 1, the following variables are 
considered according to relevant literature in the previous section: 
Government Efficacy (GE): The dependent variable is a composite indicator, 
which accounts for efficacy of government. Here, the arithmetic mean of 
government effectiveness and rule of law measures the efficacy. The World Bank’ 
official website publishes freely these sub-components under title of "World 
Governance Indicators.  
Government effectiveness centers on the views about the quality of public and 
civil services independent from political pressures, the quality of policymaking and 
administration, and the commitment of the governments to implement public 
policies. In addition, rule of law measures the extent of confidence of agents and 
obedience of social rules, the quality of contract enforcement, perceptions on 
property rights, the performance of police and courts, and the possibility of crime 
and violence. Both government effectiveness and rule of law are defined by 
standard normal distribution in interval varying from -2.5 to 2.5. In this scaling, the 
higher scores of effectiveness of government (and rule of law) mean more efficient 
public sector. 
The overall mean of government efficacy score is -0.51 during period under 
consideration, which indicates relatively poor effectiveness among OPEC 
countries.  
Government Size (GS): The size of government is measured by revenue, 
spending, deficits, and debt. In order to make comparisons between time periods or 
between states, cities, and countries, data can be adjusted by correcting for 
inflation, dividing by population (per capita), and/or expressing revenue or 
spending relative to GDP or personal income (Ulbrich, 2011). 
As a commonly used indicator, this paper measures the extent of public 
intervention in the economy by using government expenditure as percentage of 
GDP. Due to oil-dependent structure of OPEC countries, it is expected that 
government size grows in comparison with other developing countries. 
The mean of government size is 14.32 percent of GDP during 2002-2015. This 
ratio seems unexpected, since the general presumption implies big and costly 
governments in OPEC. However, one should note to an imbalanced set of 
economies within OPEC, changing from wealthy Saudi Arabia to relatively small 
Angola.  
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Logarithm of GDP per capita [Log(y)]: In international comparisons, GDP 
indicates the market size.  However, GDP per capita is a proxy for purchasing 
power. In this paper, logarithm of GDP per capita is used to explain the efficacy of 
government. This logarithmic variable is consistent with other variables' forms. It 
may have positive or negative effect on government efficacy. Nevertheless, higher 
per capita income can be interpreted as higher capacity to pay tax, which in turn 
increases the potential of government in providing services. As well, increasing 
personal incomes result in more responsibility, social awareness and commitment.  
In the World Bank website, Per capita GDP has been reported in 2005 constant 
dollar. In OPEC, the mean of per capita GDP is US$ 17953 during 2002-2015. 
According to per capita GDP, OPEC countries can be considered as an upper 
middle income group. 
Openness of economy (OPEN): The openness is another variable in explaining 
efficacy of government. An open state has international relations to other nations. 
Although goods and services are traded through commercial ties, but international 
trade standards require transparent public regulations, lack of corruption, effective 
administrative procedures, efficient logistic services and presence of control and 
monitoring mechanisms. Such provisions are perceivable in the efficient and 
accountable governments. 
The average of this variable is about 78.4 percent of GDP. This ratio indicates 
that total external trade is less than total GDP. In other words, this cartel is of 
potential to expand its trade ties with other blocs and regions. 
Rents from oil and gas exports (RENT): The financing sources of OPEC 
members are mainly divided into resource rents, and taxes and charges. As far as 
oil and gas incomes are channeled into governmental budget, there will be low 
pressure on collecting taxes. Accessible oil and gas revenues lead to schedule 
capital projects by government, on one hand, and to hire more labor in public 
sector, on the other hand.  Consequently, one can expect that resource rents help to 
enlarge government particularly in OPEC countries. In the model specified, the 
rents from oil and gas relative to GDP are included as another explanatory variable. 
The mean of variable RENT is about 25.6 percent of GDP. This figure indicates 
high dependency of OPEC to oil and gas rents. If such rents are invested in man-
made or physical capital, then development will be sustainable.  
 
3.2. Model 
According the review of literature outlined in section 2, the following model is 
defined to explain the government efficacy (GE): 
 
ititititititit RENTOPENyLogGSGE   ..)(..   (1) 
 
where GE denotes government efficacy. It is the sum of two governance 
indicators, i.e., government effectiveness and rule of law. GS measures the 
government size, as ratio of government expenditure to GDP. Log(y) means 
logarithm of per capita income and indicates purchasing power in each country. 
OPEN is a proxy for trade openness, as ratio of total external trade to GDP. RENT 
indicates the share of resource rents in GDP. Subscripts i and t denote country and 
time, respectively. In addition,  ,  , …,   are parameters to be estimated and 
it denotes error term. 
In the OPEC framework, the signs of coefficients of right-hand variables in 
equation (1) are expected as follows: 
 
0,0,0,0         (2) 
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4. Findings 
Since Equation 1 includes both time-series and cross-sectional data, it takes a 
general panel data form. Prior to estimate this equation, stationary of variables 
should be tested. In panel data, the existence of weak or strong non-stationary is of 
research concerns. For testing the stationary in panel data, several methods have 
been proposed by Breitung (2001), Im, Pesaran, & Shin (2003), and Levin, Lin, & 
Chu (2002). This paper applies the LLC strategy, which assumes unit common root 
among variables under study. As Table 1 shows, the panel unit root is rejected at 
1% level of significance. Thus, the regression is not spurious. 
 
Table 1. Panel unit root test 
Method Stat. Prob. Cross-sections Obs 
Levin, Lin & Chu, t -2.447  0.007  12  144 
Note: stat, Prob and Obs denote t- statistic, probability and number of observations, respectively. 
 
In the second step, model 1 should be tested for applying pooled or panel data 
specification. The common procedure is to test the null hypothesis indicating 
redundant fixed effects. If null hypothesis is rejected, then the decision will be in 
favor of panel data model. Otherwise, we can proceed with pooled data model. 
Table 2 reports the results of testing for redundant fixed effects. As shown, the 
panel data model is preferred to pooled data form.  
 
Table 2. Redundant fixed effects tests  
Effects Test Stat. d.f. Prob. 
Cross-Section/Period F 38.110 (24,139) 0.000 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 340.289 24 0.000 
Note: stat, df and prob denote t- statistic, degree of freedom and probability, respectively. 
 
The third test is to decide on estimating Model 1 in fixed or random effects. 
This is carried out by Hausman (1978) test representing the random effects (RE) by 
default. By rejecting null hypothesis, the decision is made supporting fixed effects 
(FE). Table 3 represents the results of Hausman test, which do not reject null 
hypothesis. As a result, Model 1 should be estimated in random effects format.  
 
Table 3. Hausman test  
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Stat. Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section random 0.917 4 0.922 
Period random 4.157 4 0.385 
Cross-section/period random 4.311 4 0.366 
Note: Chi-Sq. Stat., Chi-Sq. df and prob denote Chi-square statistic, Chi-square degree of 
freedom and probability, respectively. 
 
After testing for good specification of model, it is estimated using Eviews 
software. Table 4 denotes the econometric output. All coefficients are statistically 
significant; therefore we can interpret the coefficients. The diagnostic statistics also 
indicate the robustness of regression. In this Table, u and  are used to calculate 
the correlation coefficient (  ) of error terms of a specified cross-sectional unit 
between two different periods. In exact terms, this coefficient is defined as follows: 
 





22
2
u
           (3) 
 
Where 
2
u  and  
2  denote within (intra-level) variance and between (inter-
level) variance of error terms, respectively.  Since computed  is about 0.101, then 
correlation between cross-section error terms seems weak. Thus, the estimation 
results are reliable. 
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Table 4. Results of model estimation 
(Panel EGLS with Two-way random effects, Dependent Variable: GE) 
Variable Coeff. S. E. t-Stat. Prob.   
C -4.151 0.689 -6.022 0.000 
GS -0.011 0.005 -2.187 0.030 
LOG(y) 0.413 0.069 5.911 0.000 
OPEN 0.004 0.001 3.673 0.0003 
RENT -0.011 0.002 -5.331 0.000 
Effects Specification S.D.   Rho   
Cross-section random( u ) 
0.459 0.899 
Idiosyncratic random(  ) 
0.154 0.101 
R-squared= 0.693 Number of observation=144 
Number of cross-sections=12 
Source: Author’s calculation 
Note: C, Coef, S.E, t-stat. and Prob denote intercept term of regression, coefficient, t- statistic and 
probability, respectively. 
 
According to results reported in Table 4, if government size (GS) increases by 1%, 
the efficacy of government (GE) will decrease by 0.011, other things being equal. This 
finding is comparable to Afonso & St Aubyn (2005) arguments. In an analysis of the 
performance of 23 OECD Member States, they discussed that countries with small 
public sectors on average have a more efficient provision of public services. In 
addition, using a panel data set of 114 countries from 1980 to 2006, Hauner & Kyobe 
(2010) concluded that the higher government expenditure relative to GDP (or higher 
government size) tends to be associated with lower efficiency in the public sector.  
Both government size and resource rents (RENT) affect inversely the government 
efficacy and the magnitudes of effects are nearly equal. The negative effect of rents on 
government efficacy has been also confirmed by Anthonsen et al (2012). Emphasizing 
on the quality of government, they found significant and negative effects of oil and gas 
rent dependency on three dimensions of quality, i.e., low corruption, bureaucratic 
quality and legal impartiality, in a sample of 139 states in the period 1984 to 2006.  
GDP Per capita has significant and positive effect on government efficacy. In other 
words, the government efficacy will increase by 0.41, if the per capita GDP increases 
by 1%, ceteris paribus. Similar to findings reported in Table 4, La Porta et al (1999) 
reached a strong positive association between per capita income and government 
performance in a large cross-section of countries. As well, Hauner & Kyobe (2010) 
found that richer countries exhibit better public sector performance and efficiency. 
The openness also affects directly the efficacy of government. Hence, the open door 
policies have positive impacts on the government efficiency in the OPEC. This finding 
is compatible to Brewer et al (2007) views. Focusing on Asian countries, they argue 
that more open and transparent societies are likely to be more effective at delivering 
public services. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The numerous theories have been developed to explain the causes of growth of 
the public sector in various countries. According to the economic development 
models, all economies involve in structural changes in an evolutionary and 
historical context.  
Because of widespread ideas about economic development, there is no unique 
theory to explain the causes and phases of development. Nevertheless, Hindriks & 
Myles (2013) consider development as a three-phase process. The early phase of 
development is the period of industrialization in which the population moves from 
the countryside to the urban areas. In this stage of development, the dominant role 
of infrastructure determines the nature of public expenditure. In the so-called 
"middle stages" of development, the infrastructural expenditure of the public sector 
becomes complementary with expenditure from the private sector. Developments 
by the both public and private sector generate a range of externalities such as 
pollution and crime. And public sector gets ready to the control of these 
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externalities. Finally, in the developed phase of the economy, the equity concerns 
result in transfer payments, such as social security, health, and education, 
becoming the main items of expenditure. 
OPEC has experienced above-mentioned development stages, although the 
speed and rate of socioeconomic changes have not been equal within this group. 
This cartel' members have spent huge capital in building construction and 
infrastructure projects. In addition, OPEC has recorded increases in literacy rate, 
health standards, and per capita income. However, there are some considerable 
issues regarding the second and third phases of Hindriks and Myles' model. In fact, 
income inequality, corruption and environmental externalities are common 
problems in this economic bloc.  
The reaction of OPEC to these issues originates from institutionalized resource-
based economies. The permanent injection of oil and gas revenues into economies 
has induced governments to exert low-tax regimes. The dilemmatic matter is low 
willingness of OPEC's citizens to pay taxes. Indeed, OPEC' people is reluctant to 
pay more tax, because they regard exhaustible resources' incomes as easy financing 
tools. In Ulbrich (2011) viewpoint, if [public] services are good, and taxes are low, 
the citizens vote to retain the incumbents, or move into well-run local communities.  
What actions should be adopted by OPEC members in order to increase the 
efficacy of member states? According to findings, the top priority should be given 
to reduce the government size. Size of government may be decreased through 
adopting market-oriented policies and minimizing the extent of government 
intervention in the economic affairs. 
The OPEC governments can design new export-oriented strategies in order to 
promote non-oil exports. The diversification of exports of goods and services is a 
vital strategy for OPEC. It can decrease the reliance of OPEC to single-product 
(petroleum) economy, and may provide new foreign earnings. Investing in tourism 
industry, attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) aiming at production of outputs 
with higher value added, exporting medical, educational and financial services, 
importing intermediate and capital goods required for domestic manufacturing 
sector and creating new destinations for exports are some recommendations to 
increase the degree of trade openness. 
OPEC members can increase the effectiveness of own governments by reducing 
the share of resource rents in GDP. In this regard, OPEC countries have established 
the so-called "Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) [Retrieved from]", under different 
names, to manage oil and gas revenues. The monitoring of the foreign receipts 
entering into these Funds would help policy-makers to neutralize the effects of 
negative oil price shocks. 
This research opens new scope for future researches in order to inclusion the 
composition of government expenditure on one hand, and different indicators of 
quality of government on the other hand. In addition, the interactional effects of 
resource abundance and government size, geographical and demographic factors 
may be examined in the upcoming studies.  
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